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SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES: U.S. V. KING 
AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DISMISSAL  
OF THE PROBATIONER-PAROLEE 
DISTINCTION 
TRICIA NICHOLSON* 
Abstract: In U.S. v. King, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether a suspicionless search of a probationer, conducted pursuant to a 
condition of his probation, violated the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit 
held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because legitimate 
governmental interests outweighed the probationer’s privacy interest. In conduct-
ing the balancing test, however, the court failed to give significance to the dis-
tinction between probationers and parolees for Fourth Amendment purposes and 
used an analysis that overrides any individual privacy interest that a probationer 
may have. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Marcel King was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California of being a felon in possession of a firearm, after 
the court denied his motion to suppress evidence of a shotgun found under-
neath his bed.1 The San Francisco Police Department suspected that King was 
involved in a homicide and learned that he was on adult felony probation, 
which, under the terms of King’s probation agreement, subjected him to a sus-
picionless-search condition.2 In connection with this condition, the officers 
searched his residence and found the shotgun.3 King, in his motion to suppress, 
argued that the shotgun evidence was the fruit of an illegal search.4 The district 
court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search and 
denied King’s motion.5 On appeal, the majority of a panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the police lacked reasonable sus-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE 2013–2014. 
 1 United States v. King (King II), 672 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), vacated, 687 F.3d 1189 
(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. King (King I), No. C10-00455, 2011 WL 
9315, at *1–6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011) (ordering denial of motion to suppress fruits of search of 
King’s residence). 
 2 United States v. King (King V), 711 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 736 
F.3d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc). 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 King I, 2011 WL 9315, at *1. 
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picion of King’s involvement in criminal activity, but still upheld the denial of 
the motion to suppress, relying on U.S. v. Baker.6 Under Baker, the court 
viewed probationers and parolees equally for Fourth Amendment purposes and 
held that suspicionless search conditions for probationers did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.7 Baker, however, was in direct conflict with a Supreme 
Court case, Samson v. California, which held that parolees have fewer expecta-
tions of privacy than probationers.8 Thus, the en banc court granted a rehearing 
to consider the continuing validity of Baker in light of Samson.9 On the rehear-
ing en banc, the court overruled the Baker opinion and vacated the earlier King 
decision.10 
With Baker no longer controlling, the case was remanded to a Ninth Cir-
cuit panel.11 The remaining issue was whether the search of King’s residence 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights, given that the police lacked reasonable 
suspicion to search his residence.12 Using another Supreme Court decision, 
U.S. v. Knights, along with the Samson decision, the panel examined the totali-
ty of the circumstances to determine whether the suspicionless search of 
King’s residence was reasonable.13 In doing so, the court “‘assess[ed] . . . the 
degree to which [the search] intrudes upon [Defendant’s] privacy and . . . the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental in-
terests,’” conducting a balancing test based on these inquiries.14 The court 
found that the governmental interests at stake were substantial, while King’s 
privacy rights as a probationer were only slightly intruded upon.15 Consequent-
ly, it held that the suspicionless search, conducted pursuant to a suspicionless-
search condition of the probation agreement, did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.16 
Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the factual and procedural his-
tory of King’s case. Part II then discusses the totality test used by the majority 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See King V, 711 F.3d at 988; King II, 672 F.3d at 1139; United States v. Baker, 658 F.3d 1050, 
1055–56 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a suspicionless search of a probationer does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment), overruled by United States v. King (King IV), 687 F.3d 1189, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 7 See King V, 711 F.3d at 988–89; Baker, 658 F.3d at 1055. 
 8 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006); King V, 711 F.3d at 988–89; United States 
v. King (King III), 682 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (ordering rehearing en banc); Baker, 658 F.3d at 
1055. 
 9 See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850; King V, 711 F.3d at 988–89; King III, 682 F.3d at 779; Baker, 658 
F.3d at 1055. 
 10 King V, 711 F.3d at 989; King IV, 687 F.3d at 1189–90. 
 11 See King V, 711 F.3d at 989; King IV, 687 F.3d at 1189–90. 
 12 King V, 711 F.3d at 989. 
 13 Id. at 989–90; see Samson, 547 U.S. at 848–57; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 
(2001). 
 14 King V, 711 F.3d at 990 (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 and Knights, 534 U.S. at 119). 
 15 Id. at 990–91. 
 16 Id. 
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and the dissenting opinion’s criticism. Finally, Part III argues that the substan-
tial governmental interest offered by the court as support to outweigh King’s 
individual privacy interest will always outweigh the probationer’s individual 
privacy interests. These overly broad interests used by the court effectively 
erase any individual privacy interest a probationer may have, nearly always 
leading to an unfair result for the probationer.17 This structure ultimately re-
sults in the same outcome as that which would occur if parolees and probation-
ers were viewed equally for Fourth Amendment purposes.18 
I. KING’S SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH AND CONVICTION 
On May 10, 2010, Inspector Joseph Engler was investigating the shooting 
of Shawnte Sparks, which had occurred the night before.19 Engler spoke with 
an individual near the crime scene, known as CW1, who was one of the vic-
tim’s family members, but was not present at the crime scene.20 CW1 received 
information about the shooting from another individual, known as Moniker, 
who was present at the scene, but did not actually see the shooting.21 Moniker 
claimed to have obtained information about the identity of the shooter from a 
third individual who had allegedly seen the shooting directly.22 This fourth-
hand hearsay tip resulted in the identification of Marcel King as the suspected 
shooter.23 After receiving the tip, Engler checked King’s criminal history and 
discovered that he was on adult felony probation.24 
King was serving a probationary sentence for the willful infliction of cor-
poral injury on a cohabitant, but had never been charged or arrested for any 
firearms offense.25 There was a warrantless search condition attached to King’s 
probation agreement, stating that he was subject to warrantless searches with 
or without probable cause.26 Engler and other police officers relied on this term 
of King’s probation agreement to search his residence without a warrant and 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See id. at 988–91; id. at 995–98 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 18 See id. at 991, 995–98 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 19 United States v. King (King I), No. C10-00455, 2011 WL 9315, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011) 
(denying motion to suppress fruits of search of 78 Edgar Place, the home of the defendant’s mother). 
 20 See id. at *2–3. 
 21 Id. at *3. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See id.; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, United States v. King (King II), 672 F.3d 1133 (9th 
Cir.) (per curiam), vacated, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (No. 11-10182). 
 24 United States v. King (King V), 711 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir.) (en banc), amended and supersed-
ed by 736 F.3d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc). 
 25 CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West 2013); see Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 23, at 6. 
 26 King V, 711 F.3d at 988; King I, 2011 WL 9315, at *4. King’s warrantless search condition 
stated, “Defendant is subject to a warrantless search condition, as to defendant’s person, property, 
premises and vehicle, any time of the day or night, with or without probable cause, by any peace, 
parole or probation officer.” King V, 711 F.3d at 988. 
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found an unloaded shotgun underneath his bed.27 The police then arrested King 
and charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm.28 
King filed a motion to suppress evidence of the shotgun with the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the police 
officers lacked the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct a valid probation 
search.29 The court, however, found that there was reasonable suspicion, and 
King was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.30 King was 
never charged for the homicide that led to the search, and is no longer a sus-
pect.31 
On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit determined that the police lacked 
reasonable suspicion.32 Nevertheless, the panel held that the suspicionless 
search of King’s residence was constitutional because the Ninth Circuit had 
previously held in U.S. v. Baker that a probation condition allowing for a sus-
picionless search was constitutional.33 The Baker court had reasoned that a 
parolee and probationer had the same expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment, and thus, because suspicionless search conditions were constitu-
tional for parolees, they were constitutional for probationers as well.34 This 
premise was in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. 
California, where the Court held that probationers have a greater expectation 
of privacy than parolees.35 In light of the Samson decision, the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, reheard King’s case and overruled Baker.36 In the same opin-
ion, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel’s earlier decision and remanded it to 
the panel for a disposition consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Samson.37 
                                                                                                                           
 27 King V, 711 F.3d at 988. 
 28 King I, 2011 WL 9315, at *1. 
 29 Id. at *1–2. 
 30 King V, 711 F.3d at 988; King II, 672 F.3d at 1133–34. 
 31 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 23, at 6. 
 32 King V, 711 F.3d at 988; King II, 672 F.3d at 1139. The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning in 
United States v. Baker, in which the Ninth Circuit decided that suspicionless search conditions for 
probationers do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See King V, 711 F.3d at 988–89; King II, 672 F.3d 
at 1139; United States v. Baker, 658 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled by United States 
v. King (King IV), 687 F.3d 1189, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 33 See King V, 711 F.3d at 989; King IV, 687 F.3d at 1189–90; United States v. King (King III), 
682 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (ordering rehearing en banc); King II, 672 F.3d at 1139; Baker, 658 F.3d 
at 1055–56. 
 34 Baker, 658 F.3d at 1055–56. 
 35 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006); King V, 711 F.3d at 988–90; Baker, 658 F.3d 
at 1055–56. The Supreme Court in Samson stated, “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than 
probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” 547 
U.S. at 850. 
 36 Samson, 547 U.S. at 850; see King V, 711 F.3d at 989; King IV, 687 F.3d at 1189–90. 
 37 King V, 711 F.3d at 989; King IV, 687 F.3d at 1189–90. 
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II. DIFFERING OPINIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE  
PROBATIONER-PAROLEE DISTINCTION 
On remand, a majority of the Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in U.S. v. Knights and Samson v. California and recognized the criti-
cal distinction between probationers and parolees for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.38 Nevertheless, the majority of the Ninth Circuit placed King’s privacy 
interests as a probationer close to those of a parolee, finding the suspicionless 
search to be reasonable when weighed against the state interests.39 In her dis-
senting opinion, Judge Berzon highlighted the majority’s error, arguing that the 
majority unduly softened the probationer-parolee distinction.40 The dissent 
offered an important and significantly different view of both King’s individual 
privacy interests and the governmental interests in regards to the probationer-
parolee distinction.41 
A. The Majority’s Analysis and the Soft Probationer-Parolee Distinction 
The majority focused on whether the search of King’s residence satisfied 
the Fourth Amendment, despite the police’s lack of reasonable suspicion.42 
More specifically, the Ninth Circuit asked whether a suspicionless search, per-
formed on a condition of the defendant’s probation, violated the Fourth 
Amendment.43 To answer this question, the court balanced two opposing inter-
ests: first, the degree to which the search intruded upon King’s reasonable pri-
vacy expectations as a probationer; and second, the degree to which the search 
was necessary for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.44 
When determining the degree to which the search intruded upon King’s 
privacy as a probationer, the majority assessed King’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in light of Knights and Samson.45 In doing so, the court grappled 
with where exactly to place King’s expectations of privacy relative to those of 
a parolee and an average citizen.46 
In Knights, the Supreme Court upheld a search that was conducted pursu-
ant to the terms of the defendant’s probation agreement, which authorized 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See United States v. King (King V), 711 F.3d 986, 988–90 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded 
by 736 F.3d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc); see also Samson v. California, 547 
U.S. 843, 850 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001). 
 39 See King V, 711 F.3d at 989–91. 
 40 See id. at 991–98 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 41 See id. 
 42 Id. at 989 (majority opinion). With Baker no longer controlling, coupled with the panel majori-
ty’s holding that police lacked reasonable suspicion, the main issue was the validity of a suspicionless 
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 990. 
 45 See id. at 989–990. 
 46 See id. at 990. 
80 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:E. Supp. 
searches “with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable 
cause.”47 In that case, unlike in King’s case, the police were found to have rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity.48 In deciding Knights, the Supreme 
Court used a balancing test, considering the totality of the circumstances, in-
cluding the search condition in the probation agreement.49 
In attempting to follow Knights, the Ninth Circuit explained that one of 
the inherent facts of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute 
liberty to which every citizen is otherwise entitled.50 Thus, from the outset, the 
court placed King’s expectation of privacy below that of a citizen who is not 
subject to a criminal sanction.51 The majority lowered this expectation of pri-
vacy further, reasoning that because King agreed to the suspicionless search 
condition as a necessary condition of his probation, his expectations were sig-
nificantly diminished.52 The Ninth Circuit then compared King’s expectation 
of privacy to that of a parolee by looking to Samson.53 
In Samson, the Supreme Court held that a parolee did not have an expec-
tation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate, and that a parol-
ee’s expectation of privacy was below that of a probationer’s.54 In order to ad-
here to the probationer-parolee distinction emphasized in Samson, the Ninth 
Circuit majority placed a probationer’s expectation of privacy above a parol-
ee’s.55 Nevertheless, the majority also held that the distinction between a pa-
rolee’s privacy interest and a probationer’s was very small, and, as such, a pro-
bationer only had a slightly stronger privacy interest than parolee.56 
Regarding the governmental interests that needed to be balanced against 
the probationer’s privacy interests, the majority weighed three substantial gov-
ernmental interests.57 The first interest that the court noted was the state inter-
est in protecting potential crime victims from probationers’ recidivism.58 The 
majority explained that the recidivism rate of probationers is significantly 
higher than the general crime rate.59 The second state interest noted by the 
court was discovering criminal activity and preventing the destruction of evi-
dence.60 In support of this state interest, the court explained that probationers 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Knights, 534 U.S. at 114; King V, 711 F.3d at 989. 
 48 Knights, 534 U.S. at 114–15; King V, 711 F.3d at 989. 
 49 Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19; see King V, 711 F.3d at 990. 
 50 See King V, 711 F.3d at 990; see also Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. 
 51 See King V, 711 F.3d at 990. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. 
 54 Samson, 547 U.S. at 852. 
 55 See King V, 711 F.3d at 990. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. at 990–91; id. at 997 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 58 See id. at 990 (majority opinion). 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. 
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are more incentivized to quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than ordi-
nary criminals, because they are aware that they may be subject to supervision 
and may face serious consequences as a result.61 The third state interest that 
the court cited was an interest in a probationer’s successful completion of pro-
bation and his or her reintegration into society.62 To reinforce this point, the 
court cited the Supreme Court’s statement that the “ability to conduct suspi-
cionless searches of parolees . . . aids, rather than hinders, reintegration of pa-
rolees into productive society.”63 Although this statement specifically applies 
to parolees, the majority grouped probationers in as well.64 
When comparing King’s small privacy interest as a probationer to the 
substantial governmental interests, the court held that the search was reasona-
ble.65 The court emphasized that the state needed to have the ability to promote 
its interests through suspicionless searches of probationers and that such 
searches, when conducted pursuant to suspicionless search conditions, did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.66 
B. Judge Berzon’s Dissent Exposes the Majority’s Flaws 
Judge Berzon’s dissent focused on the majority’s failure to give proper 
weight to both the particular language in King’s search condition and the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Samson that probationers have a greater expectation 
of privacy than parolees.67 In response to the majority’s emphasis on King’s 
acceptance of the probation condition, Judge Berzon contended that the ma-
jority did not place enough significance on the specific text of the condition.68 
Emphasizing the actual text of the probation search condition, Judge Berzon 
pointed out that King’s probation agreement subjected him to searches “with or 
without probable cause” as opposed to “with or without cause” or “with or 
without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause.”69 Focusing on 
the text, Judge Berzon argued that the sentencing judge chose the specific 
phrasing for a reason, namely to require at least some type of suspicion, just 
not the high standard of probable cause.70 Judge Berzon’s reasoning implied 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. at 991. 
 63 See id. (citing Samson, 547 U.S. at 854 ). 
 64 See id. The majority simply states, “[t]hat statement is true of probationers as well,” without 
further explanation to support the assertion. See id. 
 65 See id. at 990–91. 
 66 See id. at 991. 
 67 See id. at 991–98 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 68 See id. at 991–95. 
 69 See id. at 991–92. 
 70 See id. at 992–93. According to the Supreme Court, in order to have probable cause, the officer 
must know that the search presents “a ‘fair probability’ or ‘substantial chance’ of discovering evi-
dence of criminal activity.” See id. at 993 n.4 (quoting Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 
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that the probation condition was not as unambiguous and clear as the majority 
found, and, thus, King’s individual privacy expectation should not be dimin-
ished to the level it was.71 
Judge Berzon also elaborated on the significance of King’s status as a 
probationer rather than a parolee, and argued that King’s privacy interest was 
more robust than the majority suggested.72 In doing so, she referenced a con-
curring opinion in U.S. v. Crawford, which the Samson court cited approving-
ly.73 For instance, the Crawford concurrence placed probationers and parolees 
on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their punishment and level of 
harmfulness.74 
Using the Crawford concurrence as guidance, Judge Berzon explained that 
parolees have been sentenced to prison for felonies and released before the end 
of their prison term.75 Furthermore, every person released from state prison in 
California is placed on parole, regardless of whether the inmate is capable of 
reintegration into productive society.76 In contrast, probationers are those who 
may have been convicted of an infraction, misdemeanor, or felony and subse-
quently sentenced to probation.77 Judge Berzon emphasized that while parolees 
automatically receive parole after serving time in prison, probationers are placed 
on probation upon judicial determination that the offender does not pose such a 
danger that substantial imprisonment is necessary.78 Thus, when focusing on the 
fundamental distinction between parolee and probationer, Judge Berzon argued 
that the majority should have given greater weight to King’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because of his status as a probationer.79 
                                                                                                                           
557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009)). Conversely, in searches based on reasonable suspicion, officers need only 
have “a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting Safford, 557 U.S. at 371). 
The dissent in King insisted that reasonable suspicion requires “at least a minimal level of objective 
justification.” See id. (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). 
 71 See id. at 995. 
 72 See id. at 995–96. 
 73 See id. (citing United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kleinfeld, J., 
concurring)). Officers searched Crawford’s residence, pursuant to a mandatory suspicionless search 
condition in his parole agreement, seeking his confession to a robbery that occurred two years earlier. 
Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1050–52. The court upheld Crawford’s conviction, but remanded the case for 
resentencing. Id. at 1062. 
 74 See King V, 711 F.3d at 995–96 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1077 
(Kleinfeld, J., concurring)). “[P]arolees are persons deemed to have acted more harmfully than anyone 
except those felons not released on parole. Probationers are close to the other end of the harmfulness 
scale.” Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1077 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
 75 See King V, 711 F.3d at 996 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See id. (citing Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1077 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
 79 See id. at 996–97. 
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Finally, Judge Berzon viewed the substantial governmental interests as a 
“general interest in crime control.”80 Judge Berzon explained that the govern-
ment always has a general interest in crime control, but this alone cannot justi-
fy suspicionless searches.81 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to pre-
vent routine intrusions on the fundamental right to privacy.82 The majority’s 
use of broad governmental interests contradicts this purpose.83 Finally, Judge 
Berzon noted that King’s status as a probationer, as opposed to a parolee, gave 
him a privacy interest that outweighed the governmental interests.84 
III. AN UNFAIR RESULT FOR PROBATIONERS 
Despite the majority’s initial emphasis on the probationer-parolee distinc-
tion, the broad governmental interests used to outweigh King’s privacy interest 
essentially obliterated any difference between the two.85 As a result, the out-
come was the same as it would be if parolees and probationers were treated 
identically under the Fourth Amendment.86 As the dissent highlights, there 
should be a substantial difference in the outcome of these cases, depending on 
the defendant’s status as a parolee or a probationer.87 
Although the majority relied on U.S. v. Knights and Samson v. California 
for guidance, these cases were limited in application to King’s situation.88 Un-
like the situation in Knights, where the probationer was subject to a warrantless 
search because there was reasonable suspicion that he committed a crime, po-
lice did not have reasonable suspicion in King’s case.89 Additionally, the notion 
that a parolee and probationer were not equal for Fourth Amendment purposes 
was an established principle in Samson, emphasizing the significant distinction 
between Samson and King.90 This principle in Samson was so important that 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See id. at 997 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)). 
 81 See id. 
 82 See id. at 996. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See id. at 997–98. 
 85 See United States v. King (King V), 711 F.3d 986, 988–91 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded 
by 736 F.3d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc); id. at 995–98 (Berzon, J., dissent-
ing). 
 86 See id. at 991, 995–98 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 87 See id. at 995–98. 
 88 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846–57 (2006) (considering whether a California law 
that authorized searches of parolees “with or without a search warrant and with or without cause” 
violated the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114–22 (2001) (holding that 
the warrantless search of the probationer’s residence, based on reasonable suspicion, was constitution-
al under the Fourth Amendment); King V, 711 F.3d at 988–91. 
 89 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 114–22; King V, 711 F.3d at 988–91. 
 90 See Samson, 547 U.S. at 846–57; King V, 711 F.3d at 989. 
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the Ninth Circuit went to great lengths to protect it by overruling Baker and 
related cases that contradicted it.91 
Although the majority opinion began by recognizing this distinction, it 
only placed King’s reasonable expectation of privacy on a small step above 
that of a parolee, despite the fact that there are significant differences between 
parolees and probationers.92 The dissent elaborated on these differences by 
explaining that, in regard to their level of harmfulness to society, probationers 
are more similar to average citizens than parolees.93 Unlike parolees, proba-
tioners may be first offender felons, or those convicted of an infraction or mis-
demeanor.94 King was on probation for a crime wholly unrelated to firearms, 
let alone homicide, yet he was only given an individual privacy expectation 
slightly above a convicted criminal who may have served several years in pris-
on and committed a much more serious crime.95 
The majority did slightly acknowledge the probationer-parolee distinction 
in its analysis of King’s individual privacy interests.96 They seemed to cast off 
the distinction, however, when the state interests were examined.97 The state 
interests discussed by the majority can apply to both parolees and probationers 
in different ways, yet the majority did not weigh those interests differently.98 
As Judge Berzon explained in her dissent, the majority’s first state interest, 
protecting potential victims from recidivism, fails to account for the significant 
difference in recidivism rates between probationers and parolees.99 Because 
there is a forty-three percent recidivism rate for probationers and a sixty-eight 
to seventy percent recidivism rate for parolees, this interest in preventing re-
cidivism should be weighed more favorably towards probationers.100 Addition-
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 99 See id. at 997 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
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ally, the statement from Samson that the majority used to support the third state 
interest, promoting a probationer’s successful reintegration into society, re-
ferred specifically to parolees—not probationers.101 The Supreme Court in 
Samson stated that a state’s “ability to conduct suspicionless searches of parol-
ees . . . aids, rather than hinders, the reintegration of parolees into productive 
society.”102 The majority grouped probationers into this statement without any 
further analysis.103 
When taken as a whole, the state interests can be seen as a general interest 
in crime prevention.104 This broad interest, however, overrides any distinction 
between probationers and parolees, despite the fact that both the Supreme 
Court and the Ninth Circuit specifically found the distinction important enough 
to protect.105 In essence, these three interests used by the majority will out-
weigh any individual privacy interest, whether or not the individual is a proba-
tioner or a parolee—effectively making the probationer-parolee distinction 
immaterial.106 
Although he was a probationer subject to a suspicionless search, King 
was essentially treated the same as a parolee when the court considered the 
state’s interest in preventing crime.107 As a result, despite King’s innocence 
regarding the homicide that triggered the original search, he still faces serious 
jail time because police engaged in a suspicionless search of his residence.108 
As explained previously, a probationer may be convicted of a misdemeanor, 
infraction, or a felony.109 Following this case, someone on probation for a sim-
ple infraction will have the same expectation of privacy as a parolee guilty of a 
serious felony, leading to the exact scenario the Ninth Circuit was trying to 
avoid when it overruled Baker.110 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding whether a suspicionless search, conducted pursuant to a con-
dition in a probation agreement, violated the Fourth Amendment, a majority of 
the Ninth Circuit used a balancing test in which it weighed the intrusion on the 
individual’s privacy interest against the state’s governmental interests. In doing 
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so, the court found only a slight intrusion of privacy on King’s part that was 
outweighed by three substantial governmental interests in preventing crime. 
The majority opinion failed to give significance to the distinction between pro-
bationers and parolees for Fourth Amendment purposes—a distinction that the 
Supreme Court explicitly highlighted in Samson v. California. As a result, 
King, a probationer, was treated as if he were a parolee under the Fourth 
Amendment, leading to a severely unjust result. Although King was no longer 
a suspect in the original crime and his probation was wholly unrelated to fire-
arms or homicide, he will face serious jail time because the Ninth Circuit treat-
ed him as a parolee, rather than a probationer. 
